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NOTE 
WHY DO BAD THINGS HAPPEN TO GOOD PEOPLE? AN 
EXAMINATION OF COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES AND 
THEIR ROLE IN SENTENCING 
John B. Riordan† 
ABSTRACT 
As everyone knows, when a person is convicted of a crime, that person is 
sentenced by the court. Sentencing can range from a simple fine, to 
community service, to incarceration. What many people do not know, 
however, is that sentences imposed by courts are not the only consequences 
of conviction. Indeed, even for those wrongdoings that people may 
commonly describe as “mild,” a plethora of “extra” or “collateral” 
consequences attach at the time of conviction. These collateral 
consequences, and their purpose, are the subject of this Note.  
The main concern with collateral consequences is their place in the 
sentencing process. Should courts consider these ancillary penalties when 
forming a sentence that is supposed to be proportional to the crime? The 
Eastern District of New York answered this question with a resounding 
“yes” in United States v. Nesbeth. In that case, the court was to render a 
judgment and sentence on a first-time offender who was caught importing 
cocaine. After reviewing the defendant’s history and character, the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the case, and a list of collateral consequences 
that would follow the defendant forever, the court imposed a sentence far 
lower than usual. In justifying its decision to step outside of the sentencing 
guidelines, the court noted the myriad of collateral consequences that 
would “supplement” the official sentence.  
The Second, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits have followed the example of 
the Nesbeth court and have concluded that justice cannot be served without 
considering collateral consequences during sentencing. Other circuits, 
however, have disagreed with their sister courts. The First, Sixth, Seventh, 
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Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits firmly hold that the consideration of collateral 
consequences is not appropriate for judicial sentencing. These circuits are 
concerned that considering some of these consequences would lead to 
courts sentencing defendants who have more to lose more lightly than those 
who have less to lose.  
The Nesbeth decision was a step in the right direction; however, it did not 
resolve the issue correctly. There are several proposed solutions to this 
collateral consequences issue. The most obvious is the approach taken by 
the courts, like the one in Nestbeth, that have decided to consider these 
consequences. Those courts simply consider all consequences of conviction 
and attempt to sentence appropriately. However, while justice is the goal, 
this method results in the consideration of some consequences that are not 
justiciable, and is, therefore, not the answer.  
The American Law Institute has also proposed a solution. While its 
approach is close to correct, this method complicates things too much and 
results in the equivalent of tying the courts’ hands during sentencing.  
As is the case with many legal issues, the only true solution lies in the 
hands of the Legislature. Considering the Legislature is partially to blame 
for the creation of many of these collateral consequences, it is only 
appropriate that this branch also be the one to fix the problem. First, a line 
of demarcation must be drawn between the different kinds of collateral 
consequences. Second, the Legislature should grant authority to the courts 
to consider only the appropriate consequences. Lastly, the courts should 
evaluate all of the appropriate collateral consequences during sentencing in 
order to impose a truly proportional sentence that will serve the ends of 
justice.  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Collateral consequences have existed for as long as justice has. In United 
States v. Nesbeth,1 the court identified the issues surrounding collateral 
consequences and a circuit split concerning these issues. The court 
evaluated its options and held that in order to serve the ends of justice and 
form a just sentence, it must take these consequences into consideration 
during sentencing. While many courts agree with this conclusion, just as 
many find that consideration of collateral consequences is a slippery slope 
that leads to discrimination and injustice.  
This Note proposes that while the Nesbeth court was on the right track, it 
did not answer the collateral consequences question quite right. Section II 
                                                                                                                                      
 1. United States  v. Nesbeth, 188 F. Supp. 3d 179 (E.D.N.Y. 2016). 
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of this Note discusses the history of collateral consequences and how courts 
on each side of the circuit split have handled them. Section III of this Note 
analyzes the different kinds of collateral consequences and several different 
solutions that have been proposed by legal institutions. Lastly, Section IV of 
this Note proposes the ultimate solution to the issue of collateral 
consequences and contemplates what courts should do in the meantime.  
II.  BACKGROUND 
During sentencing reform in the 1980s, Congress highlighted “four basic 
purposes of sentencing: punishment, deterrence, incapacitation, and 
rehabilitation.”2 However, in a manner that can only be described as 
counterintuitive, the American penal system today is actively thwarting 
these purposes. Successful reintegration of ex-offenders is being prevented 
by “‘[m]yriad laws, rules, and regulations.’”3 These laws, rules, and 
regulations are often referred to as “collateral consequences”4 and attach, in 
different form and number, to nearly everyone with a criminal record.  
In his Nesbeth opinion, Judge Block went as far as to compare the effect 
of these collateral consequences to “‘civil death’—or ‘the loss of rights . . . by 
a person who has been outlawed or convicted of a serious crime.’”5 Indeed, 
civil death is not a new concept. The dangers and gravity of this status has 
been known for centuries.6 Early Colonial laws only applied these 
devastating consequences to a small handful of felonies.7 However, as 
America grew, so did the penal system. With this growth came an influx of 
new crimes, each of which now holds its own treasure trove of collateral 
consequences that can wreak havoc on a convicted person’s life.8  
                                                                                                                                      
 2. Fiona Doherty, Indeterminate Sentencing Returns: The Invention of Supervised 
Release, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 958, 997 (2013) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2012)).  
 3. United States v. Nesbeth, 188 F. Supp. 3d 179, 180 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (quoting 
MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 142 (2010)).  
 4. Margaret Colgate Love, Managing Collateral Consequences in the Sentencing 
Process: The Revised Sentencing Articles of the Model Penal Code, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 247, 
258 (2015). 
 5. Nesbeth, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 180-81 (quoting Civil Death, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
(10th ed. 2014)). 
 6. Jean Chung, Felony Disenfranchisement: A Primer, THE SENTENCING PROJECT (May 
10, 2016), http://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/felony-disenfranchisement-a-
primer/.   
 7. Id.  
 8. Id. 
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Collateral consequences can result in devastating effects for a convicted 
person, but still many courts refuse to consider them when sentencing.9 
Courts’ hesitancy to consider these consequences during sentencing is likely 
the result of these “penalties” or “regulations” being considered legislative 
or  regulatory rather than punitive.10 Therefore, because these collateral 
consequences are imposed by law rather than included in a judicial 
sentence, they have been considered by some courts as not “subject to 
constitutional limitation.”11  
Courts that have chosen to consider collateral consequences, like the 
court in Nesbeth, see past labels like “penalty” and “regulation.” Instead, 
these courts see that the effects of these consequences are punitive, and, 
therefore, they should, to some extent, be considered when sentencing. 
Nesbeth is not the first case where collateral consequences were taken into 
consideration when sentencing.12 However, it is perhaps the first case to 
focus almost solely on the effect and applicability of collateral consequences. 
To truly understand the impact of this case, it is necessary to briefly open 
the history books to observe the evolution of the American penal system. 
A. The Very Beginning, A Very Good Place to Start 
During the development of the English and Irish prison systems in the 
1850s, the ultimate goal of incarceration was clear: successful reintegration 
into society.13 As a matter of fact, reintegration was so central to these early 
models that if a prisoner could not find a job when his sentence was nearing 
completion, the prison managers would aid him in finding one.14 Both the 
English and Irish models worked on a “mark” system whereby prisoners’ 
good behavior and progress in education and learning a trade could secure 
them an early release.15 In the Irish system, the last stage of incarceration 
involved living in an “intermediate” prison in which prisoners would dress 
in ordinary clothing, live in a community, and have minimal supervision.16 
This unique and effective prison model resulted in low recidivism rates and 
                                                                                                                                      
 9. Nesbeth, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 180.  
 10. Love, supra note 4, at 258. 
 11. Id.  
 12. See, e.g., United States v. Thavaraja, 740 F.3d 253, 262-63 (2d Cir. 2014) (holding 
that the lower court did not err by considering deportation as a collateral consequence of 
conviction, when crafting the defendant’s sentence).  
 13. Doherty, supra note 2, at 974-76.  
 14. Id. at 982.  
 15. Id. at 972-73. 
 16. Id. at 972. 
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nearly seamless reintegration.17 However, the most important aspect of 
these early models was their understanding and consideration of collateral 
consequences.  
In Ireland, when a prisoner obtained employment and was released, the 
only post-sentence consequence was a duty to report monthly to local law 
enforcement.18 The English system considered collateral consequences even 
more seriously, releasing prisoners unsupervised and with no attachments 
from their incarceration.19 “To impose police supervision over a poor 
wretch struggling to find employment is the way to add to his difficulties 
and throw him back into crime instead of keeping him out of it.”20 The 
stance taken by these early models was that nothing should come between a 
former prisoner and his ability to reintegrate into society.  
Observing these models, the American penal system chose to adopt 
similar principles of incarceration when developing its own system. 
Incorporating many of the English and Irish principles, new prisons were 
opened with great success, and by 1901 twelve states had opened prisons 
based on this new model.21 Unfortunately, by 1940, the Department of 
Justice reported that this system was failing because, with growing rates of 
incarceration, the prisons were becoming too difficult to run.22 It was at this 
time the penal system started to change, and by 1974, it was determined that 
“‘rehabilitative efforts . . . have had no appreciable effect on recidivism.’”23  
It is not that keeping recidivism rates low is no longer a goal of the justice 
system. As a matter of fact, all ninety-three judicial districts allow for a form 
of pretrial diversion program.24 Pretrial diversion programs allow 
                                                                                                                                      
 17. See id. 
 18. Id. at 974-75.  
 19. Doherty, supra note 2, at 974.  
 20. Id. (quoting Joshua Jebb, Explanations Showing the Difficulties Which Would 
Attend the Introduction into England of the Probationary Stages of Discipline and 
Supervision of the Police, &c., Which Have Been Adopted in Ireland, TRANSACTIONS OF THE 
NAT’L ASS’N FOR THE PROMOTION OF SOC. SCI. 402, 411, 414 (George W. Hastings ed., 1863)).  
 21. Doherty, supra note 2, at 982. 
 22. Id. at 983.  
 23. Id. at 994 (quoting Robert Martinson, What Works?—Questions and Answers About 
Prision Reform, 35 PUB. INT. 22 (1974)).  
 24. Josev Brewer, The Work in the United States Attorney’s Offices Across the Sequential 
Intercept Model, 12 LIBERTY U. L. REV. (forthcoming May 2018). In his article, Brewer 
explains that in some jurisdictions, special pretrial diversion courts decide admission to the 
program. Id. In the District of South Carolina, the court looks specifically at certain collateral 
matters such as education, employment, and contact with a pretrial officer; still, these 
considerations may not come into play during sentencing. Id. 
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prosecutors, in some cases, to help potential convicts stay out of the official 
prosecution and sentencing processes altogether.25 Participants who 
successfully complete the program may avoid ever being charged.26 
Unfortunately, these programs still do not address collateral consequences. 
First, not all individuals are eligible for the diversion program. Also, even 
those individuals who are eligible receive no aid at trial if they fail the 
program. Therefore, even though these programs represent an effort to 
meet the ends of justice, they do not directly address one of the biggest 
oversights that still exists. 
Today, while rehabilitation and reintegration are still some of the stated 
purposes of sentencing,27 as many as “50,000 federal and state statutes and 
regulations . . . impose penalties, disabilities, or disadvantages on convicted 
felons.”28 These statutes and regulations often make successful reintegration 
nearly impossible and yet, many courts have still refused to take them into 
consideration when crafting sentences. The court in Nesbeth did not follow 
that trend; instead, it chose to consider these devastating consequences in 
order to craft a more just sentence.  
B. All About United States v. Nesbeth 
The defendant in Nesbeth was convicted of importation and possession 
of cocaine.29 Prior to this conviction, the defendant had never been 
convicted of a crime and otherwise led a law-abiding life.30 Furthermore, the 
Eastern District of New York noted that although the defendant had grown 
up in lower-income circumstances, she had never used drugs herself and 
likely was just a courier for her boyfriend.31 At the time of conviction, the 
defendant was a 20-year-old college student studying education.32 
Additionally, the defendant had supported herself as a nail technician at a 
children’s spa, worked as a counselor to children in lower-income areas, 
                                                                                                                                      
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. (citing USAM § 9-22.010 (2011)).  
 27. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D) (2012) (“The court, in determining the particular 
sentence to be imposed, shall consider—the need for the sentence imposed—to provide the 
defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional 
treatment in the most effective manner . . . .”). 
 28. United States v. Nesbeth, 188 F. Supp. 3d 179, 184 (E.D.N.Y 2016).  
 29. Id. at 180.  
 30. Id. at 189.  
 31. Id. at 189-90.  
 32. Id. at 189. Due to the conviction, the defendant changed her major to sociology. Id. 
at 190. 
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and held seasonal employment on a parks maintenance crew.33 In all, the 
court highlighted that this conviction was “completely out of character.”34 
At the time the Nesbeth decision was made, there was already 
jurisprudence governing how to come to a sentencing decision. When 
reviewing the defendant’s personal information, the court must engage in a 
“multi-step process through which . . . [it] assesses the seriousness of [the] 
defendant’s current offense and past crimes to . . . determine the 
defendant’s applicable sentencing range . . . .”35 All of this information is 
then put into a “pre-sentencing report” (“PSR”) which contains “guidelines” 
that help the sentencing court determine what the proper sentence should 
be.36 After the Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, these guidelines 
were rendered only advisory, albeit still necessary to at least consider when 
sentencing.37 In United States v. Gall,38 the Court laid out a three-step 
process for courts to follow when crafting a sentence.39 First, the sentencing 
court must figure out the proper guidelines range; second, the court must 
give both parties a chance to argue for what sentence they believe is 
appropriate; lastly, the sentencing court must consider all of the 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(a) factors to determine what sentence is appropriate.40 These factors 
go directly towards Congress’ intent to address the goals of sentencing, and 
are as follows: 
The court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, 
shall consider—(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense 
and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need 
for the sentence imposed—(A) to reflect the seriousness of the 
offense, to promote respect of the law, and to provide just 
punishment for the offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence to 
criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public from further crimes 
of the defendant; and (D) to provide the defendant with needed 
educational or vocational training, medical care, or other 
correctional treatment in the most effective manner . . . .41 
                                                                                                                                      
 33. Nesbeth, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 189. 
 34. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 35. United States v. Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 471 (4th Cir. 2007).  
 36. See, e.g., Nesbeth, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 188-89.  
 37. Pauley, 511 F.3d at 472 (citing United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005)). 
 38. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007). 
 39. Pauley, 511 F.3d at 473. 
 40. Id. (citing Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49-50 (2007)).  
 41. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012).  
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The last step of the sentencing process is where the conflict arises. 
Generally, it has been held that, in considering the § 3553(a) factors, courts 
have broad discretion.42 Additionally, in determining what falls under the § 
3553(a) factor “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history 
and characteristics of the defendant,” courts are not limited and may 
consider “background, character, and conduct.”43 If, however, the court 
does choose to deviate far from the guidelines and § 3553(a) factors, it must 
justify such deviation.44 This was the issue in Nesbeth. There, the court 
decided to deviate from the guidelines and the enumerated sentencing 
factors to instead put great weight on the collateral consequences of the 
conviction.  
In Nesbeth, the Probation Department issued a PSR which recommended 
a sentence of twenty-four months and three years of supervised release.45 
However, the PSR contained no reference to any collateral consequences.46 
The court took issue with this and concluded that collateral consequences 
must be considered in order to craft a sentence that is “sufficient[] but not 
greater than necessary” to meet the ends of sentencing.47 After requesting 
and receiving a list of all applicable collateral consequences,48 the court 
highlighted that as a result of a felony conviction, the defendant would be 
ineligible for tuition assistance for the remainder of her college career.49 
Furthermore, a substantial number of statutory impairments would 
permanently attach to the defendant.50 The court also noted that this 
conviction would likely result in a strain on important family relationships 
and may result in prejudice when seeking certain employment.51 
After considering all of these factors, the court sentenced the defendant 
to one year of probation with some additional conditions, including a six-
month period of house arrest.52 In forming this sentence, the court reasoned 
                                                                                                                                      
 42. United States v. Thavaraja, 740 F.3d 253, 259 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing United States v. 
Cavera, 550 F.3d 180 (2d Cir. 2008)).  
 43. United States v. Morgan, 635 Fed. App’x 423, 444 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting United 
States v. Pinson, 542 F.3d 822, 836 (10th Cir. 2008)). 
 44. Pauley, 511 F.3d at 473.  
 45. United States v. Nesbeth, 188 F. Supp. 3d 179, 189 (E.D.N.Y. 2016).  
 46. Id. at 188. 
 47. Id. at 194 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012)).  
 48. Id. at 188. 
 49. Id. at 190.  
 50. Id. at 190-93.  
 51. Nesbeth, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 190-93. 
 52. Id. at 194-96.  
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that the collateral consequences were sufficient punishment and that 
incarceration would be unnecessary to meet the ends of sentencing 
according to § 3553(a).53 
C. Right Down the Middle: What the Circuits are Saying About Collateral 
Consequences 
Nesbeth is not representative of the majority rule. While it is true that 
courts have discretion to step outside of the § 3553(a) factors, courts have 
generally construed this discretion as permitting consideration of the 
defendant’s history or personal life, not subsequent collateral 
consequences.54 In 2003, the Supreme Court asserted that statutory 
collateral consequences should not be considered in sentencing as they 
represent only “civil disabilities” and not punishment.55 However, this 
opinion did little to conclusively resolve the question of which collateral 
consequences should be considered in sentencing. Meanwhile, courts have 
been growing increasingly more uncomfortable with turning a blind eye to 
these collateral consequences.56 At the same time, because they are often a 
creature of legislation, many courts continue to consider these 
consequences “none of their business.”57 This split was mentioned in 
Nesbeth58 and should be thoroughly analyzed before an attempt is made to 
truly resolve the issue of collateral consequences.  
At the risk of oversimplification, the two stances that circuits have taken 
in this matter can be boiled down to the following conclusions: (1) some 
circuits say collateral consequences must be considered and (2) others say 
they simply cannot.  
Representing the latter, the First, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh 
Circuits have identified several cases in which sentences were reduced after 
consideration was given to what the courts refer to as “impermissible” 
factors.59 In each of these cases the sentencing decision was reversed on 
                                                                                                                                      
 53. Id. at 194.  
 54. See United States v. Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 474 (4th Cir. 2007); see also United States 
v. Stall, 581 F.3d 276, 289 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that while family ties are not usually 
relevant to sentencing, they may be considered relevant if they have some connection to 
other permissible considerations under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)).  
 55. Love, supra note 4, at 258-59 (citing Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003).  
 56. Id. at 259.  
 57. Id. at 260.  
 58. Nesbeth, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 186-88.  
 59. United States v. Morgan, 635 Fed. App’x 423, 444-46 (10th Cir. 2015) (citing United 
States v. Stall, 581 F.3d 276, 286 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Musgrave, 761 F.3d 602, 604 
476 LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:467 
 
appeal.60 These circuits hold that § 3553(a) requires that the court fashion a 
sentence that reflects the seriousness of the offense alone, not the 
seriousness of the collateral consequences suffered by the defendant.61  
On the other side of the split, the Second, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits 
have chosen instead to align themselves with the reasoning of the Nesbeth 
court and consider collateral consequences.62 These circuits hold that 
judicial discretion can safeguard against any harmful results identified by 
the other circuits. It is the opinion of these courts that sentencing cannot be 
just unless the collateral consequences of conviction are taken into 
consideration.  
So, which side got it right? Would considering collateral consequences 
lead to overburdening the courts and possibly discrimination? Are 
convicted persons being sentenced with much more than what a judge 
imposes on them? These questions have yet to be conclusively answered, 
although the circuits have each presented their own solutions.  
1. One Holding to Rule Them All: How the Tenth Circuit in United 
States v. Morgan Represented the Stance of the First, Sixth, Seventh, 
and Eleventh Circuits 
The court in United States v. Morgan was tasked with reviewing the 
sentence imposed on the defendant by the lower court.63 The defendant was 
a practicing attorney who was elected to the Oklahoma State Senate in 
1996.64 It was while the defendant served on the senate, as chairman of the 
appropriations committee, that the bribery that ultimately led to his 
conviction and sentencing took place.65  
In 2005 and 2006, members of the Oklahoma Assisted Living Association 
(“OKALA”) started to become unhappy with the Oklahoma Department of 
Health’s practice of transferring residents from OKALA facilities to nursing 
homes.66 One such member, Crosby, an OKALA facility owner, decided to 
take action at this time and hired a lobbyist in an attempt to sway the state 
                                                                                                                                      
(6th Cir. 2014); United States v. Kuhlman, 711 F.3d 1321, 1329 (11th Cir. 2013); United 
States v. Stefonek, 179 F.3d 1030, 1038 (7th Cir. 1999)).  
 60. Morgan, 635 Fed. App’x at 444-47.  
 61. Id. at 445.  
 62. E.g., United States v. Thavaraja, 740 F.3d 253 (2d Cir. 2014).  
 63. United States v. Morgan, 635 Fed. App’x 423, 425 (10th Cir. 2015).  
 64. Id. 
 65. Id.  
 66. Id. 
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senate.67 During a meeting between the lobbyist, Crosby, and the defendant, 
the defendant told Crosby, “This is the way it works. You pay me a $1,000 a 
month retainer.”68 In exchange for these payments, the defendant eventually 
took action in the senate to limit the interaction the department of health 
had with OKALA facilities.69 
The defendant was indicted on sixty-three counts of bribery and fraud 
ranging over several years and involving several different schemes.70 
However, after a two-week trial, the defendant was only convicted of a 
single count of bribery in connection with Crosby.71 Although the 
defendant was only convicted on a single count, due to the nature and 
circumstances surrounding that single count, the lower court was given a 
PSR with a recommended sentencing range of 188 to 235 months.72 
Fortunately for the defendant, that was a recommendation the sentencing 
court did not intend to follow. 
The lower court began the sentencing process correctly by considering 
the guidelines.73 After an initial glance, however, the sentencing judge began 
chiseling away at the recommendation after reviewing several factors. First, 
the judge noted that the sentencing guideline incorporated too much of the 
information associated with the other counts the defendant was charged 
with but never convicted.74 From there, the sentencing judge continued 
striking down the recommendation based on the “goals” of sentencing and 
the collateral consequences that would be suffered by the defendant.75 
Specifically, the judge began by noting that the court had received 482 
letters in support of the defendant and his character.76 In observing these 
letters the judge noted, “I don’t think that I would know 482 people to even 
ask for a letter, much less get a positive one from all of them back.”77 After 
considering the content and meaning of the letters, the judge mentioned 
several other factors that he believed should come into play during this 
phase of sentencing. In response to the prosecution’s prayer for 
                                                                                                                                      
 67. Id.  
 68. Id. at 426.  
 69. United States v. Morgan, 635 Fed. App’x 423, 426-27 (10th Cir. 2015). 
 70. Id. at 427-28. 
 71. Id. at 428.  
 72. Id. at 439.  
 73. Id. at 440.  
 74. Id. at 439-40. 
 75. Morgan, 635 Fed. App’x at 440-41.  
 76. Id. at 441.  
 77. Id.  
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incarceration, the judge commented to the defendant, “I am personally of 
the opinion that the publicity that has followed this case from the 
beginning, the results to you both in your health, your financial health, the 
fact that you will almost certainly lose your license to practice law, I think 
all of these are factors that would surely deter anyone else considering the 
same conduct.”  
After summarizing his considerations, the judge finally sentenced the 
defendant to five years of probation, 104 hours of community service, and 
forfeiture of $12,000 in bribery money.78 With that, the defendant had 
managed to go from the possibility of prison for nearly twenty years to only 
five years of probation and a small dent in his wallet.  
Upon appeal, the Tenth Circuit began by explaining the correct 
procedure for sentencing.79 In so doing, the court laid out a two-step 
analysis to evaluate what the court referred to as “procedural 
reasonableness” and “substantive reasonableness.”80 While these 
distinctions do aid the court in coming to a conclusion, they contribute 
little to the analysis of this Note. Suffice it to say, the main concern 
mentioned by the Tenth Circuit was that if a sentencing court makes a large 
variance from the guideline range, such variance must be supported by a 
significant justification—a justification that, in this case, the Tenth Circuit 
failed to find.81 After reviewing some of the initial reasoning the sentencing 
court gave for a downgraded sentence, the Tenth Circuit turned its 
attention to the collateral consequences that were used to form the lenient 
sentence.82 Without delay the court found that the sentencing court had 
“erred in determining [the defendant] was adequately punished” by the 
aforementioned collateral consequences.83 The Tenth Circuit held these 
consequences as impermissible considerations, not because they did not 
exist, but because they had nothing to do with sentencing and would lead to 
unjust results.    
The “unjust results” that the Tenth Circuit looked to avoid are often 
referred to as “middle class sentencing.” Middle class sentencing occurs 
when a court impermissibly relies upon factors related to a defendant’s 
                                                                                                                                      
 78. Id. at 440. 
 79. Id. at 442. 
 80. Id.  
 81. Morgan, 635 Fed. App’x. at 442 (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 
(2007)).  
 82. Id. at 444. 
 83. Id.   
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social or economic standings.84 Here, the Tenth Circuit found that while 
generally there is no limitation on consideration of such factors as the 
history, character, and conduct of the defendant, “‘[i]t is impermissible for a 
court to impose a lighter sentence on white-collar defendants . . . because . . 
. [they] suffer greater reputational harm or have more to lose by 
conviction.’”85 If courts consider all collateral consequences, the result may 
be unfair discrimination to those with less-fortunate backgrounds. Due to 
its concern with middle class sentencing, the Tenth Circuit, in Morgan, 
decided that none of the collateral consequences originally observed by the 
sentencing court should be considered because “[t]hey impermissibly favor 
criminals, like [the defendant], with privileged backgrounds.”86 
The Tenth Circuit also identified several other circuits that, like itself, 
had held in opposition of considering collateral consequences when 
sentencing. Specifically, the Tenth Circuit “agree[d] with the reasoning of 
the Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits. By considering publicity, loss of 
law license, and deterioration of physical and financial health as 
punishment, the court impermissibly focused on the collateral 
consequences of Morgan's prosecution and conviction.”87 The court cited to 
several cases in which sentences were reduced after consideration was given 
to factors such as education and vocational skills, a requirement to register 
as a sex offender, years of litigation, loss of licenses, and generally leading a 
life with a felony conviction looming above them.88 In each of these cases, 
the sentencing decision was reversed on appeal due to consideration of 
impermissible factors.89 The Tenth Circuit agreed with these other circuits 
in finding that § 3553(a) requires that the court fashion a sentence that 
reflects the seriousness of the offense, not the seriousness of the collateral 
                                                                                                                                      
 84. United States v. Stefonek, 179 F.3d 1030, 1038 (7th Cir. 1999). However, even after 
explaining the pitfalls of middle class sentencing, the court in Stefonek went on to conclude, 
“We do not know whether the district judge would have departed downward on the basis of 
extraordinary family circumstances alone.” Id. This tends to insinuate that if the lower court 
had reduced the sentence on the basis of those circumstances, the sentence would have been 
affirmed. Perhaps the Seventh Circuit is still on the fence when it comes to collateral 
consequences and sentencing.  
 85. United States v. Morgan, 635 Fed. App’x 423, 444 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting United 
States v. Prosperi, 686 F.3d 32, 47 (1st Cir. 2012)).  
 86. Id. at 446. 
 87. Id. at 445. 
 88. Id. at 444-46 (citing United States v. Stall, 581 F.3d 276, 286 (6th Cir. 2009); United 
States v. Musgrave, 761 F.3d 602, 604 (6th Cir. 2014); United States v. Kuhlman, 711 F.3d 
1321, 1329 (11th Cir. 2013); United States v. Stefonek, 179 F.3d 1030, 1038 (7th Cir. 1999)).  
 89. Morgan, 635 Fed. App’x at 444-46.  
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consequences suffered by the defendant.90 The court concluded that because 
“[n]one of these collateral consequences are properly included in [the 
defendant’s] sentence,” they are out of the court’s hands and should not be 
considered.91 
Unfortunately, in an attempt to avoid the harmful results of middle class 
sentencing, the Tenth Circuit—along with all the other circuits it cited—
failed to discern which collateral consequences truly were impermissible, 
and which should be considered because of their objectivity. This 
determination is a vital step in forming a just sentence. Conversely, while 
these circuits’ wholesale disregard for collateral consequences may be 
incorrect, the circuits on the other side of this issue may also overcorrect. 
2. The Second, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits: A New Hope 
Other circuits are not as concerned with the pitfalls identified by the 
courts in opposition to the consideration of collateral consequences. 
Relying instead on judicial discretion, the courts in these circuits hold that 
sentencing can only be fair if all of the consequences of conviction are 
evaluated. The Second, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits align themselves with 
the Nesbeth court in finding that the consideration of collateral 
consequences is appropriate.  
a. United States v. Thavaraja 
In United States v. Thavaraja, the defendant was a Sri Lanka native, born 
and raised during a civil war.92 After moving to England as a refugee, 
obtaining his bachelor’s degree, and teaching there for a short time, the 
defendant moved back to Sri Lanka.93 It was at this time that he became 
involved in a minority political group seeking to establish an independent 
government.94 Though the sentencing judge would later describe this group 
as “no direct threat to the United States,” officially, the group was 
categorized as a terrorist organization.95 While he was involved with the 
group, the defendant procured twenty million dollars’ worth of military 
weapons and engaged in several forms of illegal bribery.96  
                                                                                                                                      
 90. Id. at 445.  
 91. Id. at 446.  
 92. United States v. Thavaraja, 740 F.3d 253, 256 (2d Cir. 2014).  
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 255. This political group was known as the LTTE and, while it stood for 
legitimate causes such as an end to the oppression of the Sri Lankan people, it perpetuated its 
mission through violence and war. Id.  
 95. Id. at 257. 
 96. Id. at 256.  
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Upon being captured, the defendant was extradited to the United States 
for prosecution, where, after six years of incarceration, he was convicted of 
war crimes.97 The sentencing court was given a guideline range of 360 
months to life; however, due to max-sentence restrictions, that 
recommendation was capped at 240 months.98 Despite these 
recommendations, however, the sentencing court, looking to the “full range 
of circumstances presented,” imposed a sentence of only “108 months on 
[one] charge and 60 months on [another] (to run concurrently).”99  
The prosecutors argued that the sentencing court evaluated certain 
impermissible considerations such as the defendant’s imminent 
deportation.100 The Second Circuit was not persuaded by this argument and, 
instead, found that all of the sentencing court’s considerations were 
proper.101 In fact, the court found that “a sentencing judge may 
appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as 
to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it 
may come.”102 The court found that considerations of the defendant’s time 
served, family situation, and likely deportation were all permissible 
considerations necessary to arriving at a sentence that is “sufficient, but not 
greater than necessary” to serve the ends of justice.103 In concluding, the 
Second Circuit found that the sentencing court had imposed a sentence that 
“reflects thoughtful and principled consideration by a conscientious district 
judge of all the factors relevant to an individualized determination of a fair 
and just sentence.”104 
The Second Circuit, in Thavaraja, recognized the impact of collateral 
consequences and their impact on a convicted person’s life. Because of that, 
the court decided that it was appropriate to consider these consequences 
when forming a sentence. In this way, the Second Circuit aligned itself with 
the reasoning of the Nesbeth court.  
b. United States v. Pauley 
The Fourth Circuit was faced with a similar scenario when the lower 
sentencing court reduced a sentence after considering several collateral 
                                                                                                                                      
 97. Id. at 256-58. 
 98. Thavaraja, 740 F.3d  at 257.  
 99. Id. at 258 
 100. Id. at 262.  
 101. Id.  
 102. Id. (citing Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 398 (1995)).  
 103. Id. at 262-63.  
 104. Thavaraja, 740 F.3d at 263. 
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consequences. In United States v. Pauley, the defendant was an art teacher 
at a high school when he was approached by an underage student to 
purchase lude photographs the student had taken of herself.105 The 
defendant agreed to this transaction and the two continued this relationship 
for over a year.106 Eventually, an investigation was conducted, and the 
images given by the underage student were found.107 The defendant was 
arrested and charged with possession of child pornography.108 
At trial, a PSR was generated, proposing a suggested sentencing range of 
97 to 121 months’ incarceration.109 However, like the court in Thavaraja, 
the sentencing court did not adhere to this recommendation. The 
sentencing court imposed a downward variance sentence of only forty-two 
month’s imprisonment, naming several factors that were influential in the 
large divergence.110 Among these factors, the lower court considered that 
the defendant was a “model citizen and a good father” and would “los[e] his 
teaching certificate and his state pension.”111 On appeal, the prosecution 
argued that these factors were not relevant and led to an “unreasonable” 
sentence variation.112 The Fourth Circuit disagreed.  
In reviewing the sentence, the court found that the consideration of 
factors such as the defendant’s family life was consistent with § 3553’s 
“history and characteristics” factor.113 Further, the court did not find error 
in the sentencing court’s consideration of the fact that the defendant would 
lose his teaching certificate and state pension.114 In fact, the Fourth Circuit 
found that consideration of factors such as these reflects “the need for ‘just 
punishment’ and ‘adequate deterrence.’”115 The court concluded that the 
sentence met the ends of justice and affirmed the lower court’s decision.116 
The conviction of the circuits on this side of the split is that “[i]t is 
difficult to see how a court can properly calibrate a ‘just punishment’ if it 
                                                                                                                                      
 105. United States v. Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 469 (4th Cir. 2007).  
 106. Id. at 469-70. 
 107. Id.  
 108. Id. at 470.  
 109. Id.  
 110. Id.  
 111. Pauley, 511 F.3d at 470.  
 112. Id. at 471.  
 113. Id. at 474.  
 114. Id. at 474-75 
 115. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B)). 
 116. Id. at 475-76.  
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does not consider the collateral effects of a particular sentence.”117 The 
courts in Nesbeth, Thavaraja, and Pauley are not alone in this conviction.118 
More and more courts are recognizing the importance of collateral 
consequences in forming a just sentence. Unfortunately, while this 
recognition does result in more just sentencing most of the time, courts’ 
approaches to considering these consequences is not ideal.  
Much like how the circuits in opposition to the consideration of 
collateral consequences fell to one extreme by refusing to consider any form 
of them, the circuits in support of such consideration fell to the opposite 
extreme. Because they have recognized how collateral consequences affect 
individuals even after their sentence is served, these courts allow virtually 
any consideration to influence their sentencing decisions. Such 
consequences could range from statutory provisions that limit a convicted 
person’s right to vote to social changes, such as the convicted person being 
excluded from family or community events.  
The court in Nesbeth, along with the courts in the Second, Fourth, and 
Eighth Circuits, took a step in the right direction. They recognized that 
while sentences may be just, standing alone, when all of the collateral 
consequences of conviction are considered, the result is often essentially 
“over-sentencing.” However, although the court in Nesbeth was trying to 
bring about the most just result, the manner in which they went about 
doing so is not the ultimate solution to this issue.  
III.  TOO HOT, TOO COLD, AND JUST RIGHT: WHAT NESBETH, AND OTHER 
DECISIONS, GOT RIGHT AND WHAT THEY GOT WRONG 
The Nesbeth decision represents a step towards a more just method of 
sentencing. However, all of the courts that have addressed collateral 
consequences have failed to parse out the real issue. Because of this, they 
could not prescribe the best solution or approach. In order to truly 
understand collateral consequences and their role in sentencing, a court 
must first identify the different categories of collateral consequences. While 
the courts in the above decisions seemed to have lumped all of the 
consequences together (either rejecting them or embracing them), that is 
not the correct approach. Because of this confusion, decisions on both sides 
                                                                                                                                      
 117. United States v. Nesbeth, 188 F. Supp. 3d 179, 187 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (quoting United 
States v. Stewart, 590 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2009)).  
 118. See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 533 F.3d 623, 633 (8th Cir. 2008) (choosing to 
consider the defendant’s “loss of . . . reputation and his company” when sentencing). 
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of the circuit split have been partially correct.119 After identifying the 
different kinds of collateral consequences, one must select a solution that 
appropriately incorporates these consequences into sentencing. This second 
step is vital to ensure that the sentence is adjusted in conjunction with 
collateral consequences, but not unreasonably so.120 Finally, one must 
ensure the sentencing purposes of § 3553(a) are still being met.  
A. One of These Things Is Not Like the Other: Identifying Different Forms of 
Collateral Consequences 
In crafting the defendant’s sentence in Nesbeth, the court considered 
several collateral consequences.121 Some of these consequences were 
statutory and attached to the defendant as a matter of law. Two such 
consequences were, (1) being barred from obtaining employment in an 
FDIC-insured bank for ten years and (2) being permanently prevented from 
owning a firearm.122 Other consequences considered by the court were not 
attached as a matter of law. The court highlighted that because child care 
services conduct background checks, the defendant’s conviction may be 
grounds for her being denied employment.123 Clearly these consequences 
are different in nature. While the former attaches as a matter of law, the 
latter may or may not attach as a result of conviction. However, the court 
failed to recognize the distinction in Nesbeth, choosing instead to bundle all 
of these into the category of “collateral consequences.”  
This is not an uncommon occurrence. All of the courts discussed in this 
Note failed to distinguish different collateral consequences as well. This 
should not be the case. Each kind of collateral consequence is 
fundamentally different and deserves its own analysis. This Note proposes 
that there should be two categories of collateral consequences: legislative 
and civil.  
                                                                                                                                      
 119. As will be discussed in the next subsection, there are some collateral consequences 
that should be considered 100 percent of the time and others that should almost never be 
considered. Because of this, when the circuits on one side of the split say that certain 
considerations are “impermissible,” they are partially correct. Likewise, on the other side of 
the split, when the circuits say that all collateral consequences must be considered, they too 
are partially right. The only way to resolve these decisions is to dissect exactly what is 
appropriate for consideration and what is not.  
 120. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (emphasizing the importance of 
adhering to sentencing guidelines, only varying for good cause).  
 121. United States v. Nesbeth, 188 F. Supp. 3d 179, 190-93 (E.D.N.Y. 2016).  
 122. Id. at 191 (citing 49 C.F.R. § 1544.229 (2016); 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2016)).  
 123. Id. at 190-91.  
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1. Legislative Consequences 
Legislative consequences are sometimes referred to as “mandatory” 
because they attach to a defendant after conviction automatically by ways of 
statutory sanction or some other regulation.124 Sentencing courts have no 
discretion over these legislative consequences and historically have not 
considered them when sentencing.125 However, these are just the 
consequences that must be considered. They are not a part of the court’s 
sentence but still impose penalties on the defendant that sometimes last 
forever.126 In Virginia alone, the commission of any felony results in the 
application of over four-hundred different collateral consequences.127 These 
include consequences such as ineligibility to participate in some Medicaid 
services;128 revocation of certain types of insurances;129 and even denial of 
certain professional certifications.130 
Because these consequences are a result of legislation, many courts view 
them as regulatory only, ignoring entirely their punitive nature. Therefore, 
sentences imposed by courts in such jurisdictions represent only the 
beginning of a convicted individual’s true punishment. The courts that do 
realize the impact of these consequences understand that they cannot 
impose a sentence that is “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” 
according to § 3553(a)131 without first considering post-sentence 
consequences.  
Another reason legislative consequences should be considered is because 
they are objective. While speculation about the social or economic status of 
a defendant after conviction can often times lead to discrimination, 
legislative consequences attach after conviction regardless of social or 
                                                                                                                                      
 124. Love, supra note 4, at 259.  
 125. Id.  
 126. See Federal Statutes Imposing Collateral Consequences Upon Conviction, JUSTICE.GOV 
(October 14, 2017, 9:39 PM), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/pardon/legacy/2006/11/ 
13/collateral_consequences.pdf; see also, The Council of State Governments, National Inventory of 
the Collateral Consequences of Conviction, JUST. CTR. THE COUNCIL OF ST. GOV’T (October 14, 2017 
9:34 p.m.), https://niccc.csgjusticecenter.org/description/. 
 127. The Council of State Governments, Virginia, JUST. CTR. THE COUNCIL OF ST. GOV’T 
(January 10, 2018, 4:58 PM), https://niccc.csgjusticecenter.org/search/?jurisdiction=47. 
 128. The Council of State Governments, Consequence Details, JUST. CTR. THE COUNCIL OF 
ST. GOV’T (January 10, 2018, 4:58 PM), https://niccc.csgjusticecenter.org/ 
consequences/154858/. 
 129. Id.  
 130. Id.  
 131. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012).  
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economic status.132 A court considering these consequences would not have 
to fear the pitfall of middle class sentencing. Additionally, while 
consideration of legislative consequences would require more work of 
sentencing judges, accessing and assessing these consequences would not be 
unreasonable. The court in Nesbeth simply asked the probation department 
to compile a list of the applicable consequences.133 Alternatively, courts 
could utilize the numerous collateral consequences databases created by 
both governmental and non-governmental entities.134 These databases make 
it simple and easy to view all applicable consequences according to state and 
offense.135 
However, although these legislative consequences are truly punitive in 
nature and always objective, they are somehow still not regularly considered 
when forming sentences. This was not the case with the court in Nesbeth. 
There, the court made the right decision in having the Probation 
Department compile a list of the applicable legislative consequences so that 
the court could better shape the sentence. These legislative consequences 
were not the only ones considered by the court in Nesbeth.  
2. Civil Consequences 
While legislative consequences should always be considered when 
sentencing, civil consequences should be considered sparingly, if at all.136 
While these are the kinds of consequences that are often felt the most and 
garner the most attention in both the public and private eye, courts’ 
consideration of these would more often than not result in distortion of 
justice.137 This is because civil consequences generally look to a defendant’s 
social or economic condition. It is easy to see how consideration of such 
subjective factors could result in inconsistent sentencing.  
                                                                                                                                      
 132. Nesbeth, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 184-85.  
 133. Id. at 188.  
 134. See Federal Statutes Imposing Collateral Consequences Upon Conviction, JUSTICE.GOV 
(October 14, 2017, 9:39 PM), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/pardon/legacy/ 
2006/11/13/collateral_consequences.pdf; see also, The Council of State Governments, National 
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(October 14, 2017, 9:34 PM), https://niccc.csgjusticecenter.org/description/. 
 135. Id.  
 136. The author of this Note uses the term “civil consequences” to describe a very broad, 
often ambiguous category of consequences. 
 137. See Shaila Dewan, The Collateral Victims of Criminal Justice, N.Y. TIMES (October 
14, 2017, 9:43 PM), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/06/sunday-review/the-collateral-
victims-of-criminal-justice.html (showing how the public often views collateral 
consequences).  
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In Nesbeth, the court identified several consequences that would fall into 
the “civil” category. Specifically, the court relied quite heavily on the fact 
that the defendant may not be selected for work in her chosen field: 
education.138 While this consequence may very well be the result of the 
defendant’s conviction, it is far from absolute. At best, the court could only 
speculate as to what effect the conviction would have on the defendant’s 
employment opportunities.139 In choosing to consider this consequence, the 
Nesbeth court could have easily fallen prey to the dangers of middle class 
sentencing.140  
Consider a hypothetical. Imagine that instead of a poor young college 
student whose dream was to teach children (such as the defendant in 
Nesbeth), the defendant was a law student just about to obtain her J.D. At 
the time she was charged with drug distribution and possession, this law 
student had job offers from three of the country’s largest firms. Surely, the 
consequence of losing those three high-paying firm positions would be 
greater than the loss of being able to teach in a small school, right? Looking 
at the two scenarios from a purely financial aspect, the law student has 
much more to lose than the potential school teacher. This is the problem 
with considering civil consequences. Unlike legislative consequences, civil 
ones tend to favor those who have more to lose. It is hard for a court to be 
objective and impartial when considering such factors.  
Civil consequences are not always impermissible, however. As 
mentioned previously, sentencing courts have broad discretion over what 
factors to consider under §3553(a).141 This discretion was not granted in 
error. In considering which factors are relevant to a specific defendant, 
courts should use their judicial experience to conclude what civil 
consequences would fit within or meet the purposes of §3553(a). For 
instance, §3553 specifically requires courts to consider the “history and 
characteristics of each defendant.”142 This requirement clearly shows that 
there is a strong element of subjectivity to sentencing. It is when a sentence 
is lessened or unreasonably changed because of civil consequences that such 
considerations may be abused. Instead, if a court considered certain 
                                                                                                                                      
 138. Nesbeth, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 190.  
 139. Id.  
 140. See also United States v. Anderson, 533 F.3d 623, 633 (8th Cir. 2008) (choosing to 
consider the defendant’s “loss of . . . reputation and his company” when sentencing).  
 141. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 264 (2005). 
 142. 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2012).  
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subjective factors and made “sideways”143 adjustments in sentencing, justice 
could still be served and middle class sentencing avoided. In this way, some 
civil consequences that are not specifically enumerated in § 3553(a) may be 
considered without being discriminatory.  
Of course, civil consequences can be dangerous to consider for the same 
reasons legislative consequences are prudent to consider. First, unlike 
legislative consequences, civil consequences are almost always subjective. 
Therefore, consideration of civil consequences can much more easily result 
in middle class sentencing than the consideration of legislative ones. 
Further, accessing and assessing appropriate civil consequences is much 
more difficult and nuanced than with legislative ones. While there are 
databases and probation offices to aid a court in reviewing all applicable 
legislative consequences, there are no such tools to access civil 
consequences. Because of this, when a court attempts to consider these 
subjective consequences, what was intended as a well-meaning 
consideration may in fact be non-justiciable speculation.  
Due to their punitive nature, objectivity, and ease of review, legislative 
consequences should always be considered by courts when crafting 
sentences. This will ensure that a defendant is not over-sentenced by 
consequences that do not even relate to his offense. Conversely, civil 
consequences should be considered only when absolutely appropriate. 
Other than the factors enumerated in §3553(a), courts should be 
conservative when considering other post-conviction consequences. 
Specifically, when determining whether a consequence is appropriate to 
consider, courts should stay clear of consequences relating to a defendant’s 
social or economic standing. In this way, courts will be able to tailor a 
sentence and accomplish the goals of sentencing according to § 3553(a) 
while avoiding the pitfalls of middle class sentencing.  
B. There Can Only Be One: Examining the Different Ways to Consider 
Collateral Consequences  
Now that the different categories of collateral consequences have been 
separated, this section will examine the different methods of incorporating 
                                                                                                                                      
 143. The term “sideways adjustment” refers to a sentencing court changing not the 
severity, but the nature of a punishment. For instance, if, after the considerations of 
reasonable civil consequences, a judge was to determine that a recommended custodial 
sentence would result in inequitable consequences to the convict, the judge could impose a 
higher non-custodial sentence instead. By increasing the non-custodial punishment, a judge 
may balance and equate the non-custodial sentence to the custodial one and, while changing 
the nature of the punishment, maintain the severity of the penalty.  
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these consequences into sentencing. Four methods will be considered: first, 
the courts’ “take the wheel” approach; second, the American Bar 
Association’s approach; third, the Uniform Law Commission’s approach; 
lastly, the Model Penal Code’s approach.  
1. The Courts’ “Take the Wheel” Approach  
This approach does not require a lengthy discussion as the perfect 
example of its application was given in Nesbeth. As discussed above, courts 
are growing uncomfortable with the way collateral consequences essentially 
create a collateral sentence over which they have no control.144 However, 
because courts are well-versed with the distinction between their function 
and the Legislature’s, they are hesitant to make a ruling that renders void a 
statute or regulation. Instead, they are forced to compromise their sentence. 
In Nesbeth, after considering all of the legislative consequences imposed on 
the defendant, instead of choosing to limit those consequences, the court 
decided to impose a sentence far outside the guidelines.145 
The problem with this approach is that courts are limiting themselves 
and the carefully constructed sentencing system. While collateral 
consequences should be considered, they should not be allowed to impair 
this system. However, because courts have no control as to which legislative 
penalties apply, they are forced to instead use the power they do have. The 
result of the courts’ approach is a distortion in well-established methods of 
sentence construction rather than a change in legislative consequences that 
may not even be appropriate in the first place. While results like the one in 
Nesbeth may represent a more justice-driven approach to sentencing, the 
manner in which the court went about considering collateral consequences 
is flawed. That being said, it may have been the only choice it had. 
2. The American Bar Association’s Approach 
In 2003, the American Bar Association (“ABA”) proposed a solution to 
the issue of collateral consequences. In its proposal, the ABA suggested that 
courts have the power to grant relief from collateral consequences upon 
request of the convicted party.146 The proposal also required courts, 
according to “generally applicable principles of [sentencing],” to “ensure 
that the totality of the penalty is not unduly severe.”147 Other than these 
                                                                                                                                      
 144. Love, supra note 4, at 259. 
 145. United States v. Nesbeth, 188 F. Supp. 3d 179, 194-95 (E.D.N.Y. 2016).  
 146. Love, supra note 4, at 261-62.  
 147. Id. at 262 (quoting Am. Bar Ass'n, ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Collateral 
Sanctions and Discretionary Disqualification of Convicted Persons 9, Standard 19-2.4 (3d ed. 
2003)). 
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standards, the ABA proposal contained little else to guide courts in their 
consideration of collateral consequences.  
Besides the general lack of specificity the ABA offered in their proposal, 
their solution had a few other problems that rendered it sub-optimal. First, 
the proposal did not establish a standard by which courts could review 
collateral consequences at sentencing.148 Instead, the proposal merely 
suggests that consequences could be considered during or after sentencing. 
Also, the proposal does not address civil consequences at all. Therefore, 
under this standard, courts are once again left without guidance as to 
whether to consider civil consequences. In effect, the ABA’s proposal 
created a way by which convicted persons could submit a motion of sorts to 
the sentencing court to consider granting relief from a legislative 
consequence. This is not the ideal solution because certain collateral 
consequences should always be part of a court’s considerations at 
sentencing, regardless of any action by the convicted party.  
3. The Uniform Law Commission’s Approach 
The Uniform Law Commission’s (“ULC”) approach was a bit more 
defined than the ABA’s. The ULC permitted a defendant to petition the 
sentencing court, at sentencing or before sentencing, for relief from specific 
legislative consequences.149 Upon petition, the court could review the 
collateral consequences complained of and grant relief after a finding that 
such relief would “materially assist the individual in obtaining or 
maintaining employment, education, housing, public benefits, or 
occupational licensing.”150 
This approach resolved the timing issue that was present in the ABA’s 
approach. However, other problems with this approach preclude it from 
being the ultimate solution. One such problem is the test proposed for 
courts to use. In essence, this proposal requires courts to conduct a form of 
rational relation test between the collateral consequence and the convicted 
person’s job, education, living situation, or other subjective needs. While 
this does offer relief where relief may be needed, it is not the appropriate 
test. This is because under this standard, courts are asked to relate the 
consequence with a needed benefit, instead of relating the consequence with 
the crime committed. By conflating these considerations, the ULC may 
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actually be granting more relief than necessary to meet the ends of justice.151 
Additionally, like the ABA approach, the ULC approach provides no 
guidance for the consideration of civil consequences. Therefore, the ULC 
approach is not the ultimate solution.  
4. The Model Penal Code’s Approach 
In a proposal approved by the American Law Institute in 2014, the 
Model Penal Code (“MPC”) outlines its approach to how courts should 
handle collateral consequences.152 According to this proposal, courts would 
first be made aware of all of the applicable legislative consequences by their 
jurisdiction’s sentencing commission.153 Then the court would have 
authority over which penalties or regulations applied and which were not 
necessary.154 In deciding which legislative consequences should apply and 
which should not, the MPC correctly proposes a kind of rational relation 
test.155 Unlike the test proposed by the ULC, the MPC test instructs courts 
to only authorize legislative consequences that are closely related to the 
crime committed. 
At this point, it appears the MPC has formed the most justice-driven 
solution to this issue. Unlike the other approaches,156 courts would be made 
aware of all applicable legislative consequences at the beginning of 
sentencing and would be able to consider them at that time. Furthermore, 
under this approach, only the appropriate legislative consequences would 
be considered. However, there are still cracks in this proposal.  
Under this approach, legislative consequences become “as much a part of 
the court’s sentencing function as a fine or prison term.”157 This should not 
be the case. The mandatory penalties that attach at conviction were enacted 
by the Legislature. These were put in place to be in addition to and separate 
from sentences crafted by courts. However, because of their punitive nature, 
                                                                                                                                      
 151. This concept is fairly confusing. Because of this, it will be discussed at greater length 
in the next section of this Note. 
 152. Love, supra note 4, at 265. This approach also contains proposals of how courts 
should approach granting relief from collateral consequences after sentencing. Id. at 266-70. 
However, for the purposes of this Note, only the proposal as to how courts should consider 
collateral consequences at sentencing will be discussed.  
 153. Id. at 265.  
 154. Id. at 266.  
 155. Id. at 276.  
 156. Id. at 260-64 (discussing the Uniform Law Commission’s approach that allows 
courts to grant relief from legislative consequences only after the defendant has petitioned 
the court to do so).  
 157. Id. at 272.  
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these penalties should require some judicial evaluation before they attach to 
a convicted person. The MPC proposal has two problems stemming from 
this mixing of the powers. First, if these legislative consequences become 
part of the sentence itself, the Judiciary takes away at least some of the 
function of the Legislature. Second, the well-established judicial sentencing 
system loses part of its usefulness. These legislative consequences should 
not serve as punishment imposed by a court. Rather, these penalties should 
be imposed as a matter of law while being governed by the sentencing 
courts to ensure only the appropriate ones are imposed. Therefore, the 
MPC approach fails to determine exactly how it is appropriate for courts to 
consider collateral consequences.  
IV.  THE SOLUTION 
In his dissenting opinion in Padilla v. Kentucky, Justice Scalia explained 
the issue with courts taking the wheel from the Legislature. He explained 
that the “[L]egislat[ure] . . . could solve the problems . . . in a more precise 
and targeted fashion.”158 This is especially applicable here. Specifically, in 
regards to legislative collateral consequences, courts may not influence their 
applicability or severity. Because of this, courts are varying severely from 
sentencing guidelines in order to offset the effects of such legislative 
penalties. As discussed earlier, even if courts did have the authority to 
choose which legislative consequences applied, there is still a problem with 
considering these penalties as part of the sentence. A permanent solution 
requires legislative action.  
The Legislature should give the courts discretion (much like that granted 
by the MPC) over which legislative consequences apply. However, this 
legislation should specify that these penalties are still imposed as a matter of 
law and not as a judicial sentence. In this way, the separation of powers is 
maintained while ensuring that individuals are not being over-sentenced. 
By allowing the Legislature to maintain control over these statutes and 
regulations, the courts will remain safe from criticism and the Legislature 
will be able to perfect some of its already proven legislation. 
If the Legislature were to give courts this discretion, the ball would once 
again be in the Judiciary’s court. In determining which penalties, 
                                                                                                                                      
 158. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 392 (2010) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also United 
States v. Nesbeth, 188 F. Supp. 3d 179, 198 (“While consideration of the collateral 
consequences . . . should be part of a sentencing judge’s calculus in arriving at a just 
punishment, it does nothing, of course, to mitigate the fact that those consequences will still 
attach. It is for Congress and the states’ legislatures to determine whether the plethora of 
post-sentence punishments imposed upon felons is truly warranted . . . .”).  
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regulations, or sanctions to apply, courts could use the established 
considerations of fairness and policy they use to determine appropriate 
sentences.159 The MPC proposed the correct test to be used by courts in 
determining which legislative consequences should apply and which should 
not. This Note also proposes that a simple rational basis test should be used 
by courts in determining which legislative consequences should be allowed 
or disallowed.  
For instance, if a person opens another person’s mail, he is guilty of the 
federal offense of obstruction of correspondence.160 Because that is a felony, 
the guilty party would no longer be able to own a firearm in many states. If 
a court were granted discretion by the legislature to conduct a rational 
relation test under circumstances like these, it could be determined that 
there is no rational relation between the (likely) non-violent crime of 
obstruction of correspondence and the right to own a firearm. Therefore, 
that collateral consequence could be rendered inapplicable by the 
sentencing court. Conversely, if the court were to review a legislative 
consequence that held that the felon could no longer find employment at a 
postal office, it would likely be determined that there is a strong rational 
relation between the consequence and the crime.  
Using this rational relation test results in a different result than the test 
proposed by the ULC. Consider another example, instead applying the ULC 
test. A party is convicted of a violent crime felony. As in the case of 
obstruction of correspondence, this party may no longer own a firearm in 
many states. However, this party previously worked as a private body guard; 
a job that required the usage of a firearm. Under the ULC test, a court might 
find that, because the legislative consequence detrimentally affects the 
party’s ability to maintain his employment, that legislative consequence 
should not apply. However, that result does not serve one of the most 
fundamental goals of justice: incapacitation. A person convicted of a violent 
felony could very well not be trusted with an instrument that could be used 
to cause further violent harm. Under the correct rational relation test, this 
distortion would not occur.  
Of course, the rational relation test proposed above should not be the 
only analysis conducted by sentencing courts. In order to keep a clear line 
between the court’s sentence and the legislative consequences, courts should 
strive to determine the legislative intent of each applicable statute or 
                                                                                                                                      
 159. For instance, courts could use 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to help establish the purpose of 
each legislative consequence.  
 160. 18 U.S.C. § 1702 (1994).  
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regulation. In so doing, the courts could accomplish both the goals of 
sentencing and of the legislation.  
As for civil consequences, sentencing courts should consider them 
sparingly and cautiously. This Note proposes that a test similar to the one 
proposed by the ULC may be more appropriately applied to civil 
consequences. While comparing legislative consequences to a convicted 
person’s employment, education, or other personal benefits may be 
inappropriate, it may be just the right test for civil consequences. If courts, 
in their judicial discretion, conducted a rational relation test between civil 
consequences and their effect on an individual’s “employment, education, 
housing, public benefits, or occupational licensing,” the result would be less 
speculative than the courts’ current approach. Overall, however, civil 
consequences are the real culprits in middle class sentencing, and as such 
they should be considered largely non-justiciable.  
Unfortunately, legislative action like what is needed here does not 
happen overnight. Especially considering the recentness of the unrest in the 
justice system, it may be quite a while before the Legislature takes notice of 
this pressing issue. So, what should be done in the mean time? Should 
collateral consequences continue to haunt ex-offenders well after they have 
completed their sentence? This Note proposes that they should not. The 
Nesbeth court did not take the ideal approach in addressing this issue. 
However, considering the current state of case law and stagnant character of 
legislative consequences, perhaps their approach was the most appropriate 
at the time. After considering the civil and legislative collateral 
consequences, along with the factors and sentencing goals under § 3553(a), 
the Nesbeth court did the only thing they had the power to do: shape the 
sentence. It is true that the court may have considered some impermissible 
civil consequences; however, in the end, the court, in its judicial experience, 
took a “means to an end” approach that brought about a just sentence.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
Sentencing courts have a responsibility to serve justice when delivering a 
sentence. According to history and § 3553(a), the goals of sentencing are 
punishment, deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and reintegration. 
Collateral consequences frustrate these purposes by making it nearly 
impossible for ex-offenders to truly be rehabilitated and reintegrate into 
society. With ex-offenders facing a range of stigmas and disabilities as the 
result of a criminal conviction every day, it is no wonder courts see so many 
familiar faces being led through their halls.  
In order to serve the purposes of justice, courts must consider collateral 
consequences in the sentencing stage. What consequences are appropriate 
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to be considered must be evaluated to determine that discrimination is 
avoided while tailor-made sentences are imposed. Additionally, the manner 
in which these consequences are permitted to influence sentencing should 
be carefully controlled. The best way to ensure offenders are not being over 
sentenced is for the Legislature to grant the sentencing courts some 
discretion over which legislative consequences should be imposed and 
which are unnecessary to serve the goals of sentencing and of the 
legislation.  
In the end, U.S. v. Nesbeth represents a clear step in the right direction. 
The court may not have figured out the perfect path to take, but it used 
what powers it had to ensure a just sentence was delivered. Collateral 
consequences represent just another speed bump on the road to perfecting 
the greatest justice system in the world. If courts, like the one in Nesbeth, 
continue to take such care in guaranteeing that fairness and justice guide 
their decisions, there should be no doubt that the issue of collateral 
consequences and their role in sentencing will someday be just another 
American success story. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
